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Introduction
Over the course of his decades as a law professor, Peter Gerhart
produced a stellar body of work that upended academic trends in a
number of ways. In an age when academics burrow into ever-smaller
niche areas they claim as specialized fiefdoms, Peter’s writing spanned
fields as disparate as torts, contracts, and property. While most
scholarship emphasizes depth over breadth, Peter went broad, engaging
some of the most important and fundamental questions about the law.
These features characterize all of Peter’s work but are best reflected
in his recent trilogy of monographs that constructs a unified theory of
several different areas of law: Tort Law and Social Morality (2010),
Property Law and Social Morality (2014), and Contract Law and Social
Morality (2021). Toward the end of his career, when many other
professors would be enjoying retirement, Peter raised his game and
produced perhaps his most memorable work. These three volumes reach
across—and call into question the coherence of—major fields of law.
They introduce novel ways of thinking about the relationship between
the blackletter law of these fields and social mores. And they propound
a humane vision of the law that provides an aspirational guidepost for
scholars and judges to use in thinking about the development of each
of these fields.

†

Baker Botts LLP Professor and Assistant Dean for Faculty Development,
University of Houston Law Center.
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In this short essay honoring Peter’s legacy to the legal academy, I
seek to make a modest contribution with respect to one of these books.1
Much warranted praise has been heaped on Property Law and Social
Morality, including by me.2 Here, I make a different move, instead
showing how Peter’s insights in this volume link into debates in
property law more generally, and in particular the tension between
scholarship in the tradition of neoclassical economics and its progressive
counterpart. Peter’s work has more in common with the latter than the
former, though it bears a number of distinctive features that promise
to enhance the progressive vision of ownership advanced by writers in
this school of thought. That Peter’s work on property falls cleanly into
neither dominant school of thought epitomizes his independence and
creativity as a scholar.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. First, I quickly summarize the
dyad that characterizes most contemporary property scholarship, one
side inflected by law and economics, the other by what has become
known as progressive property. Second, I examine how Peter’s views
expressed in Property Law and Social Morality fit into this dyad and
show, in particular, how those views contrast with and complement
each of them. Finally, I conclude on a personal note, reflecting on my
fondness and admiration for Peter as a colleague, mentor, and friend.

I.

An Incredibly Brief Sketch of Contemporary
Property Theory

Volumes have been written on the varieties of contemporary
property theory.3 In Part I, I offer a satellite-level overview of two main
strains of such theory, which I’ll refer to as law and economics (“L&E”)
and progressive property. This in turn will enable me to situate Peter’s
work in the context of these theories in Part II.
A.

Law & Economics and Property

The later-20th century saw the core principles of neoclassical
economics pervade legal scholarship to such a degree that the principles
of L&E have become a default way for many scholars (and judges and

1.

Namely, Peter M. Gerhart, Property Law and Social Morality
(2014).

2.

See generally Symposium, A Review: Peter Gerhart’s Property Law and
Social Morality, 2 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 187 (2015); Dave Fagundes,
Property, Morality, and Moral Psychology: Comments on Gerhart’s Property
Law and Social Morality, 2 Tex. A&M J. Prop. L. 229 (2015).

3.

See generally, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver,
An Introduction to Property Theory (2012).
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lawyers) to think about the law and the world.4 L&E is a welfarist
theory in that it holds that decisions should be made not by reference
to rights, but to outcomes.5 It is conversant with Bentham’s utilitarianism in that it seeks to maximize net social welfare. When considering
various decisions, Bentham or an adherent of L&E would agree that
the best decision is the one that creates the best on-balance outcome,
as measured by some uniform criterion such as “utility.”6
In terms of property, L&E frames the core challenge as seeking to
maximize the social welfare generated by land and chattels—i.e., to
manage those resources in the most efficient way possible.7 This
challenge is best framed by considering Hardin’s familiar “tragedy of
the commons.”8 Imagine land that is open for all to use. Assume—as
L&E does—that those who seek to use it want to extract the most
possible value from it, regardless of the interests of others. Assume
further that any one individual’s use will exclude another’s (i.e., that
uses of the resource are “rivalrous”). So framed, the outcome is obvious:
people will compete chaotically with one another to use as much of the
resource as they can, as quickly as they can, until there’s nothing left.
The inefficiencies of such a scenario are also obvious: people will extract
excessively, the chaos created will be damaging, and the resource will
be quickly depleted.
While one could imagine state management as a solution to the
tragedy of the commons, L&E proponents spurn such an approach.
Government, in their view, is invariably an imperfect predictor of the
4.

People have been observing the influence of L&E for decades. See
generally, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Pervasive Influence of Economic
Analysis on Legal Decisionmaking, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 107 (1994).

5.

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Principles and Methods of Law
and Economics: Basic Tools for Normative Reasoning 33 (2005).

6.

Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, Wealth, Utility, and the Human
Dimension, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 590, 596–97 (2005) (discussing
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation (1789)). There’s some disagreement as to the appropriate
criterion for measuring utility. Bentham himself preferred a view that
would embrace an outcome that made most people better off, even if some
were made worse off. We now call this the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. Id. at
597 (first discussing Bentham, supra; then discussing Nicholas Kaldor,
Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of
Utility, 49 Econ. J. 549, 549–52 (1939); and then discussing J.R. Hicks,
The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 Econ. J. 696 (1939)). A competing, more stringent approach requires that a decision make some people
better off, while making none worse-off. This is the Pareto criterion. Id.
at 596.

7.

Daniel H. Cole, The Law & Economics Approach to Property, 3 Prop.
L. Rev. 212 (2014), reprinted in Researching Property Law 106, 107–
08 (Susan Bright & Sarah Blandy eds., 2016).

8.

See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science
1243 (1968).
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optimal allocation of resources.9 Far better is to rely on people
themselves to allocate property efficiently. After all, private individuals
themselves know their own desires better than any agent or proxy, so
their decisions will operate as revealed preferences for the best way to
organize resources. And a system of private property that grants owners
the rights to use, exclude, and transfer enables individuals to reflect
these preferences with the state in the background as an enforcer rather
than in the foreground as an allocator.10 If Alice has a pasture and
others want to graze their sheep there, Alice can leverage her right to
exclude to keep them out, thereby forestalling overexploitation
concerns. If Alice then wants to build a house on her pasture, she’s free
to realize that desire thanks to the right to use. And if it turns out that
Alice values her land less than Bo, Bo will be willing to pay an amount
Alice finds attractive to acquire the farm himself, allowing Alice to
internalize the value of the work she did to improve her land.11
This turbo-sketch leaves much out but does frame three major
commitments of L&E for property.
First, this framework centers the concerns, decisions, and interests
of individual owners, as opposed to non-owners or the community in
general. And L&E imagines these owners to be rational actors who have
concern only for their own interests and perfect information about the
implications of their decisions with respect to their resources.12
Second, L&E is a monist theory. It seeks to evaluate the costs and
benefits of all property-related decisions along a single metric. Because
it’s difficult to find one metric that can capture all the costs and benefits
of a given decision, L&E typically defaults to using wealth as a proxy
for welfare, hence welfare-maximization often bleeds into wealthmaximization as the lodestar criterion.13
Third, L&E tends to favor strong owners’ rights. This is not because
of a stated normative precommitment in favor of owners, but rather an
implication of the belief that private parties are better at achieving
9.

Michael J. Trebilcock, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 23 Monash
U. L. Rev. 123, 132–33 (1997).

10.

R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ.
1, 14 (1959).

11.

The idea that private actors will optimally allocate resources through
transactions is typically attributed to Nobelist Ronald Coase as the
“Coase theorem,” but this is only half right. Coase argued that such
optimal reallocation of resources would happen only absent transaction
costs, and the ever presence of those costs suggested that such reallocation
was unlikely to happen in every instance. See Robert C. Ellickson, The
Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 Yale L.J. 611, 612–13
(1989).

12.

See Cole, supra note 7, at 10.

13.

Thomas J. Miceli, Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts,
Property, Litigation 4 (1997).
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allocative efficiency than the state. When owners’ rights are at their
zenith, the theory goes, then owners can best exercise the kind of
decision-making that reveals their preferences, rather than having the
state override their judgment with public-oriented exceptions.14
B.

Progressive Property

L&E’s growing influence as a conceptual framework during the later
1900s did not go unchallenged. Many scholars simply wrote in a
different vein, propounding ways to think about property that did not
embrace the tenets of neoclassical economics.15 By the early 2000s,
though, several of these writers began to assemble their efforts into a
project rooted in the shared features of their work. This counterweight
to L&E arose largely as a response to the pervasiveness of economic
approaches to property and cast itself as “progressive property.”16 As
with any academic movement, it belies quick summary, but I
summarize a non-exclusive list of three of its core commitments below,
each of which I array against its L&E counterpart.
First, while the protagonist of the L&E story is the rational-actor
property owner, progressive property takes a wider lens. It
acknowledges, as any perspective on property must, the importance of
owners, but attends also to property’s roles in creating community as
well as wealth.17 While L&E tends to regard property as socially
valuable because it confers on owners the prerogative to “exit” (i.e.,
subtract themselves from public life and the influence of states),
progressives emphasize the capacity of property to facilitate “entrance”
(i.e., property’s capacity to shape community life and bring people
together in shared spaces).18 Progressive property also casts much shade
on the rational actor that occupies the central role in the L&E
discourse. Progressives point out that evidence suggests that neither
property owners nor anyone else actually have perfect information or

14.

See Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G. Medema, Economics and the
Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond 108 (2nd ed.
2006) (noting that “once [property] rights are defined and assigned, the
parties are then free to trade the rights, and will do so if it is in their selfinterest”); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale
L.J. 1, 60–61 (2000) (challenging the typical L&E view that common-law
courts create more efficient property rules than legislatures).

15.

E.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev.
1849, 1851 (1987).

16.

See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William
Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 743 (2009).

17.

Id. at 743–44.

18.

Compare id. at 744, with Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 132–33.
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engage in optimal decision-making and suggest that this in turn
diminishes the import of L&E both descriptively and normatively.19
Second, progressives reject L&E’s attempt to reduce all propertyrelated costs and benefits to a single metric. In part, this is because
they think the typical metric L&E uses—wealth as a proxy for
welfare—fails to capture the variety of implications at play in property
decisions and transactions.20 Even more, progressives are skeptical of
the idea of monism because they regard the values implicated by
property, which include wealth generation but also safety, civic
identity, environmental stewardship, and a sense of home, to be
incommensurable.21 Progressives are thus committed value pluralists,
rejecting the single-value criterion on which L&E relies as a counterproductive distortion, and calling instead for conversations about
property that explicitly acknowledge and negotiate plural and incommensurable values.22
Third, while L&E trends in favor of greater owners’ rights,
progressive property prefers more public-facing limitation on those
rights. Consonant with its consideration for the implications of property
law for community, not just owner, interests, progressive property
places relatively higher value on securing the well-being of that
community, even if it comes at the expense of limited property
entitlements.23 Related, progressives emphasize that owners have not
only negative rights to promote their own wealth creation, but also
affirmative obligations to promote the flourishing of non-owners.24
Progressives are thus skeptical of the unfettered private property rights
that L&E celebrates for these reasons, but also because total ownership
confers on only some people power over the resources that we all need
to live a full life.

19.

See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23, 35–
43 (1989) (cataloging empirical evidence tending to cast doubt on rational
actors’ existence); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L.
Rev. 823–24, 823 n.5 (2009) (discussing and collecting L&E’s critiques).

20.

See Zachary Bray, The New Progressive Property and the Low-Income
Housing Conflict, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1109, 1124–25 (2012) (first citing
Peñalver, supra note 19, at 823–24 (2009); and then citing Eric T.
Freyfogle, The Land We Share: Private Property and the
Common Good 187 (2003)).

21.

Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 743–44.

22.

Id. at 744.

23.

Bray, supra note 20, at 1120–21.

24.

Id. at 1156.
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II. Peter Gerhart and Contemporary Property
Theory
Peter Gerhart was an admirably independent scholar. Instead of
seeking a narrow niche into which his work could fit, he sought instead
to craft his own model of a just and humane common law, including
property law. For this reason, Peter’s Property and Social Morality does
not spend much time situating his work in the context of other
academics; instead, he jumps right in to propound his own vision. In
this Part, I explore that vision. I first summarize Peter’s approach to
property expressed in his monograph on the topic. I then examine how
his perspective matches up with the dominant trends of L&E and
progressive-property scholarship.
A.

Gerhart’s Property and Social Morality

Peter’s project with respect to property, as with torts and contracts,
sought to make sense of the domain of property without adopting a
particular methodological approach.25 He sought to “reorient the field
to understand it as one about how individuals ought to treat one
another if they are to form an authentic community.”26 His core thesis
was that property rights arise when and only when an individual has
no responsibilities to be concerned with the well-being of others; when
an individual has such responsibilities, that is where limits to property
rights are located.27 Peter was thus primarily concerned with investing
this notion of social responsibility with content. He framed this content
in terms of “inputs” into decision-making processes.28 In his view, then,
property law was not a mere act of balancing the interests of owners
and non-owners. It was much more, a reflection of the shared values a
society holds dear. By assigning to (or denying) an owner the right to
extract value from their resources, society expresses and makes real its
values about how individuals should treat each other.29
Peter elaborated his theory through four tensions that arise in
property law, showing how his view mediated these familiar dilemmas
in distinctive ways. First, is there an essential content to property or is
it merely an aggregation of different prerogatives granted by the state?30
Here, Peter argued that the answer lies somewhere in between. The
25.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 4.

26.

Id. at ix.

27.

See id. at 5.

28.

See id. at 7–8.

29.

See id. at 9 (“We can understand property by the values that serve as
inputs into determining the relationship between individuals.”).

30.

Compare, e.g., 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2, with Denise
R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 247,
252–53 (2007).
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content of property rights is not random or subject to legislative whim
but can and should morph over time as social values change.31 Second,
does property come from an individual’s claim of right or society’s
assent to their ownership? Here, Peter’s theory rejects the dichotomy,
proposing instead that the scope of an owner’s claim of right is subject
to that claim meeting “socially valued norms of behavior.”32 Third, is
there any “public interest” separate from the aggregation of individual
interests? Here, too, Peter’s theory disputes the premise of the question,
arguing that how owners behave towards non-owners to whom they
have an obligation is valid only to the extent that it reflects the values
with which society has invested property law.33 Any notion of “public
interest” would be subsumed in Peter’s model by the moral force of
property law itself. Finally, do we understand property in terms of what
people value or in terms of the social values that property uses to
coordinate resource use? Here, Peter’s theory regards property as a site
where moral values are expressed but insists that the expression of those
values is effectuated through the decisions of individual owners.34
Having parsed out the content of Peter’s theory of property, the
question remains how to operationalize these abstract ideas? Here,
Peter posits a central role for law and institutions. “[L]aw,” he explains,
“mediates between the diverse interests of a heterogeneous community
by determining which decisions of individuals have been made in
accordance with values that the community endorses.”35 The process of
imbuing property with social values begins with owners. A unique
feature of Peter’s theory of property is his notion of the owner as a
“constrained decision maker.”36 This model confers on owners the
authority to act with respect to their property, but not without limit.37
Those limits are found in values expressed by some community

31.

See Gerhart, supra note 1, at 14.

32.

Id. at 14–15 (“[R]ights of ownership are validated by the community—
giving rights their moral force—while social recognition provides an
implicit constraint on the owner’s scope of decisions.”).

33.

Id. (“An owner has authority to make a wide variety of decisions about a
resource, but only if her behavior reflects decisions that take into account,
in an appropriate way, the interest and well-being of individuals toward
whom the owner has an obligation.”).

34.

Id. at 16 (“[E]ach decision maker must act in a way that appropriately
assigns the burdens and benefits of decisions about resource use (the economic
view), taking into account the values the community has developed to
determine how to assign burdens and benefits (the philosophical view).”).

35.

Id. at 19.

36.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 46.

37.

See id. at 47 (noting that, “[f]rom the time humans began collecting in
communities,” society has put “constraints” on individual owners).
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consensus. Social morality thus determines the content of and the
constraints on an owner’s property rights.38
Familiar institutions then enter the picture as the bodies that police
the legitimacy of owners’ decisions. Peter invokes a principal/agent
model to link owners with community mores.39 Courts and legislators
act as agents of the community in assuring that owners act in a
sufficiently other-regarding manner. Courts can invalidate owner
conduct by limiting the scope of property rights and substituting a
better decisionmaker. For example, Peter reads Hinman v. Pacific Air
Transport40 as holding that owners were not good governors of the
airspace high over their houses, and that the state could do a better job
via agency coordination.41 Legislatures, too, can determine the content
of the constraints on owners’ rights. Peter uses takings as an example,
as lawmakers invoke the power of eminent domain to shift decisionmaking authority over a resource from a private owner to the public.42
And what happens if institutions begin to drift from social
consensus? Here, Peter makes the interesting suggestion that “threats
of violence and social pressure” will remind the sovereign when their
law needs to change to accommodate developing community norms.43
By means of this organic process where institutions are necessarily
responsive to social change, the shape and content of property rights
will remain constantly in “flux.”44
B.

Gerhart v. L&E

At first glance, Peter’s vision of property seems profoundly different
than those imbued with the influence of neoclassical economics. These
views are, probably in most respects, distinct. Peter’s view is neither
monist nor (necessarily) welfarist. On the contrary, he accepts the
inevitability of multiple values determining the content of property law
through individual decisions as governed by institutions.45 And while
Peter disclaims any particular methodological inclination, he asserts as
38.

Id. at 74 (“[Property] [r]ights come because, and to the extent that, the
community, or a large proportion of the community, recognizes the justness of the claims of possession, labor, or other attributes of ownership.”).

39.

Id. at 50.

40.

84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).

41.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 51.

42.

Id. at 257.

43.

Id. at 48. Peter recognizes the costs of making violence against institutions
a part of his theory, and tempers this assertion later by suggesting that
institutions should be open to incorporating social norms as they change
“in order to limit self-help and violence as means of changing shared belief
systems.” Id. at 96.

44.

Id. at 49.

45.

Id. at 19.
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the “foundational principle” of his theory “the principle of equal freedom,” rather than maximal utility.46 Moreover, Peter’s theory is—to an
extent nearly absent in L&E—concerned with the other-regarding
obligations of owners. While L&E would ask simply whether a property
owner’s decision is welfare-maximizing, Peter’s theory focuses instead
on whether the decision attends to the concerns of non-owners in a way
consonant with social mores.47 Finally, and related, while L&E centers
the rational-actor individual in its narrative, Peter’s approach invokes
the greater community as an object of concern. In fact, one goal of
property law in his model is to “form an authentic community.”48
While Peter’s take on property largely diverges from L&E, it would
be too quick to simply conclude that they are entirely dissimilar. On
the contrary, closer observation reveals two important points of
significant—though incomplete—consonance between the two. First,
consider each theory from the perspective of individualism. L&E
regards the owner herself as the primary actor and nearly exclusive
object of concern, because honoring her revealed preferences is the best
way to maximize the value of property.49 In a slightly different register,
Peter’s theory, too, centers on the individual. One of his major
descriptive insights is to regard the property owner as a constrained
decision maker. 50 In this respect, Peter, like L&E adherents, orients his
theory around individual owners, who have presumptively broad power
to act until constrained by the state. Similarly, Peter’s approach
acknowledges the positive aspects of conferring power on owners (as
opposed to progressives, who regard that power with much more
skepticism).
The individualism of Peter’s theory is, of course, distinct from
L&E’s. For one thing, central to Peter’s view of individual decisionmaking authority are the constraints on that authority, which L&E
backgrounds to a much greater extent.51 And in giving content to these
constraints, Peter invites the state to take a greater role in managing
private property rights than adherents of L&E would. Even so, the fact
that the individual plays a central role in Peter’s theory, and indeed
that the process of determining the content of property law begins with
and inevitably runs through owners provides a less obvious point of
convergence with L&E’s strong, though distinct, individualism.
Second, and related, there are interesting similarities between Peter
and L&E in terms of how the content of property law arises. L&E and
46.

Id. at 20.

47.

Id. at 15.

48.

Id. at ix.

49.

See supra Part I.

50.

See supra Part II(A).

51.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 15.
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libertarian theories of law’s genesis more generally celebrate the
efficiency of allowing law to bubble up from below, allowing behavior
to cohere around shared norms until it represents a consensus adopted
by courts or legislators.52 This model of investing law with content bears
striking similarity to Peter’s answer to the question of how we should
arrive at the shared values that constitute property law. Where some
progressives advocate particular values that state actors should impose
top-down on owners, Peter argues that, in managing constraints on
owners’ rights, law should defer to and explicitly adopt only those
values that society has first developed.53 Here, Peter often invokes the
term “social recognition” to describe values that have enough community consensus behind them that they warrant adoption as governing
principles for property law.54 In this respect, his view is a close cousin
to L&E’s premise that a legal system that defers to and prioritizes
individuals’ revealed preferences will result in optimal outcomes.
This similarity leaves Peter open to a criticism that is often lodged
against L&E as well. If we let revealed preferences run free, then what
happens if those preferences result in unjust outcomes? With respect to
L&E, this concern invokes the “utility monster” critique of Benthamite
utilitarianism.55 If one owner derives an outsized amount of value from
occupying all the land in a given area, allocating all that land to her
would be the efficient outcome, even if that leaves everyone else
homeless. In terms of Peter’s view, a different but related concern arises.
If property law should be invested with values that arise as social norms
arise and cohere into consensus, what is to say that those values will
respect the concerns of non-owners, or of political or social minorities?
It seems not only possible but plausible that values determined by
general social recognition would tend to underrepresent the interests of
those who did not recognize that view. This is especially problematic
for a theory like Peter’s that aspires toward decency and equal
treatment of all individuals.56

52.

Robert Sugden, Contractarianism and Norms, 100 Ethics 768, 769–70
(1990).

53.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 16 (arguing that the constraints on owners’
decision-making authority with respect to resources must “tak[e] into account
the values the community has developed to determine how to assign burdens
and benefits”).

54.

Id. at 73.

55.

Matti Häyry, Just Better Utilitarianism, 30 Cambridge Q. Healthcare
Ethics 343, 347 (2020).

56.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 20 (emphasizing as a core principle of his
theory that “each individual is entitled to respect equal to the respect given
to every other individual”).
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C.

Gerhart v. Progressive Property

Just as one might quickly conclude that Peter’s property views were
wholly at odds with L&E, so might an unreflective glance suggest that
he is simply a fellow traveler with progressive property theorists. And
in many respects Peter’s work is conversant with the progressives’. Both
express concern about the interests of and law’s effects on the greater
community rather than prioritizing the interest of owners.57 Related,
both emphasize the importance of values apart from welfare or wealth
maximization, invoking notions of dignity and distributive justice that
are largely absent in the L&E property literatures.58 Peter’s emphasis
on the other-regarding duties of property owners echoes the work of
leading progressive-property scholar Gregory Alexander. Alexander’s
major contribution to this school of thought is to locate what he calls
“social obligation norm[s]” in the body of American property law that
obligate owners to act in the interests of non-owners.59 By the same
token, on Peter’s account, the very shape of property law hinges on the
extent to which owners act as “ideal decision maker[s],” which in turn
is defined as an owner who makes decisions that “appropriately
account[] for the well-being of others.”60
Yet as a closer look revealed unexpected points of consonance
between Peter’s views and L&E, so does scrutiny reveal surprising
points of dissonance between his theory and progressive property.
Consider, for example, how each view supplies the values meant to
guide property law. In contrast to the welfarist monism of L&E,
progressives embrace value pluralism.61 They reject the notion that any
particular value should dominate property, and instead insist on the
inclusion of different kinds of values to animate debates about the
appropriate scope of ownership.62 Peter’s view is in one sense copacetic
with the progressives, since he does not espouse a single criterion that
should determine the shape of property law. Instead, Peter is agnostic
about values, preferring to leave their choice to the community whose
norms and institutions give rise to that law.
Peter’s approach leaves space for a community to invoke a variety
of values when supplying its property law with normative content. But
57.

See id. at 54–55; supra Part I(B) (discussing progressive theory).

58.

See Gerhart, supra note 1, at 7–8; supra Part I(B).

59.

Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property
Law, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 745, 748 (2009).

60.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 54.

61.

E.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 Fordham L.
Rev. 1020, 1035–52 (2011) (discussing value monism and pluralism, and
deciding in favor of pluralism); Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 743–
44.

62.

E.g., Alexander, supra note 61, at 1020; Alexander et al., supra note 16,
at 744.
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unlike the progressives, Peter’s approach does not require that
ownership rights be infused with plural values. Since the community
may decide which values it uses, it remains possible under his model
that it would choose a single criterion, even the welfarist one that
progressives spurn. The better way to think about the issue is that
while L&E is monist and progressive property is value pluralist, Peter’s
approach is simply indifferent to this issue, devolving not only the
choice of values, but the meta-choice whether to embrace a single value
versus plural ones, onto the relevant decision-makers. This again
highlights the tension inherent in Peter’s aspiration that property law
reflects principles like respect and equality, while choosing to effectuate
that end by allowing bodies to make that decision that might not share
those principles.63
Consider a second point of divergence: the role of value promotion
for the state in the view of Peter and the progressives. The latter
espouse value pluralism, but in many instances individual exponents of
a progressive perspective also advocate particular (non-exclusive)
normative criteria they believe should animate property, such as human
flourishing64 or democracy promotion.65 This connotes a top-down vision
of values in property, where those values are chosen and then become
a framework used by the state for crafting the rights of owners versus
those of the community.66 For Peter, the state takes a less prominent
role. Peter’s model situates the owner, not the state, as the primary
decision-maker, albeit one subject to constraints. Those constraints are
policed by the state, but only if the owner’s conduct fails to express
sufficient regard for non-owners. And whether the owner has
overstepped is itself a question that is a product of social consensus that
arises out of shared norms that coalesce into law, rather than ideal
principles at which institutions arrive and then use to manage the scope
of ownership rights.
For Peter, then, the state invokes values only as necessary to
prevent owners from violating community norms about other-oriented
conduct. For the progressives, the state takes a more active role in value
63.

See supra Part II(A).

64.

See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 20, at 828; see, e.g., Alexander, supra note
59, at 745 (2009).

65.

See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a
Free and Democratic Society, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 1009, 1055 (2009).

66.

Progressives insist on plural voices in determining that outcome, noting
that “plural values implicated by property are incommensurable.”
Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 744. Because those values “cannot be
adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric,” it is
important, in the progressive view, not to assume that any one individual
can understand or evaluate all values, or that any one value can capture
the human experience. Id. (“Reducing such values as health, friendship,
human dignity, and environmental integrity to one common currency
distorts their intrinsic worth.”).
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development and promotion, setting the terms—inspired by plural
values—institutions use to manage the scope of property rights. Each
of these approaches has its virtues and drawbacks. One possible pushback to Peter’s view is that allowing norms to bubble up from below
and become law is that this process can be both gradualist and messy,
at times even violent when there is significant social dissensus about
the content of norms. When the state can simply determine the content
of values, it can act more swiftly and without having to wait to observe
social consensus develop. But the downside of this approach is that it
risks the state adopting values that are at odds with social consensus,
especially when the primary institutional actor responsible for these
acts are courts that need not respond to democratic processes. And as
Peter warns, when the values expressed by institutions diverge from
social norms, that too can risk conflict, as people feel alienated from
the values imposed on them by those institutions.67
A final point of divergence between Peter’s views and progressive
property is a place where those views diverge from L&E as well. Peter
regarded both L&E and progressive property as efforts to balance the
interests of owners and non-owners.68 This oppositional model of
“clashing interests, clashing rights, or clashing values,” in his view,
could give rise to theories of owners’ or non-owners’ rights but not to
the single, elegant theory of property that Peter sought to develop.69
Moreover, conceiving property theory as the effort to reconcile
competing interests would invariably run afoul of the incommensurability of the different values at stake and the impossibility of defining
the contours of the different entitlements at stake.70 He aspired, instead,
to create a theory that would account at once for property rights and
their limitations, rather than predominantly for one or the other,
thereby avoiding the need to engage in the balancing that, in his view,
hamstrung both L&E and progressive property.

Conclusion
Peter Gerhart’s Property and Social Morality took a strong position
about the role of values, especially other-oriented values, in American
property law, and developed a distinctive model for how institutions
should reflect those values doctrinally. Ever the fiercely independent
thinker, Peter did not pause long to situate his theory in the context of
property scholarship generally, preferring instead to use his time
67.

Gerhart, supra note 1, at 96 (arguing that it makes sense to “institutionalize
norm development through governance in order to limit self-help and
violence as a means of changing shared belief systems.”).

68.

See id. at 9.

69.

Id. at 10.

70.

See id. at 11.
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propounding his own ideas. Hence, the ambition of this short essay has
been to supply some sense of how Peter’s work does fit in with the
major currents of U.S. property scholarship. Space does not permit a
full analysis of this issue, but this brief sketch revealed that while
Peter’s theory lies closer to the progressive property than the L&E end
of the spectrum, his views bear notable divergences with the latter and
surprising convergences with the former. Peter’s work thus does not fit
comfortably with the mainstream of property theory, in the best
possible way. It diverges from both dominant views, and in so doing
challenges each of them, and us, to think critically and constructively
about what property should be.
That Peter’s views on property are as unorthodox as they are
original and provocative is unsurprising. All of these encomiums and
more fit with his entire body of work, which extends far beyond
Property and Social Morality, his work with which I am most familiar.
That familiarity, and my meeting Peter, grew out of one of the
fortunate bits of serendipity that often occur in academia. In 2014, the
Texas A&M Journal of Real Property Law was hosting a panel on
Peter’s recently released monograph. A panelist had dropped out, and
I was selected as a late replacement, presumably because at the time I
was writing about the intersection of moral psychology and intangible
property. The event supplied an invaluable chance to explore how moral
psychology reflected on real property generally, and to explore Peter’s
work in particular.
It also gave me a chance to meet Peter and learn about his work.
All the qualities that distinguished Peter’s scholarship and his presence
as a leading light in the academy were on display during the panel,
particularly in his responses to the various contributions on and
critiques about his work. The panelists—self included—generally
admired Property and Social Morality but raised some tough questions
about it as well. At the end of the day, Peter rose to respond to his
critics. Rather than seeming defensive or dismissive of our various perspectives, Peter seemed delighted. He clearly relished the opportunity
to have a variety of scholars engage with his work and regarded the
critiques as a chance to deepen and strengthen his theory. He pushed
back as necessary when he felt that our objections were not on point,
but on the whole operated as a model that I, as a then-still-young
scholar, found invaluable for engaging with critics.
Happily, my professional interactions with Peter continued after
the Texas A&M panel. He invited me to participate in another panel
he formed at the annual meeting of the Association of Law, Property
& Society (ALPS) the next year. He was also an influential supporter
soon after, when I was a candidate for a lateral position at the
University of Houston Law Center. I most recently saw Peter virtually
when I presented a paper on copyright and administrative law at a
faculty workshop at Case Western Reserve University School of Law
just last November. These topics were far afield from Peter’s private-
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law wheelhouse, but all his best qualities were on display nonetheless.
He had read the paper and was able to engage with it, equal parts
challenging and helpful, all the while joking about his shaky broadband
connection.
Peter’s passing this February came as a shock to me, as it did to
so many others. And while his loss is an incalculable one to the legal
academy, in the months since, I’ve sought to remain somewhat upbeat
by thinking not about what we’ve lost but what Peter gave us. His
three recent books alone constitute a major rethinking of core commonlaw topics, providing rich fodder for legal scholars for decades to come.
There’s no easy cure for the sadness occasioned by Peter’s absence, but
there is so much to celebrate in the scholarship he created and the
legacy he left for all of us.
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